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<EPI>Liberal democracy was saved only by nuclear weapons. . . . NATO adopted 
the doctrine of MAD (mutual assured destruction), according to which even 
conventional Soviet attacks would be answered by an all-out nuclear strike. . . . 
Without nukes, there would have been no Woodstock, no Beatles and no 
overflowing supermarkets. 
—Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow</EPI> 
 
<EPI>A rational decision process will be understood . . . to refer to the entire 
reasoning activity that intervenes between the receipt of a decision stimulus and 
the ultimate decisions. . . . Such an approach forces rational behavior to be 
thought of as essentially algorithmic. This makes it natural to model a rational 
player as a suitably programmed computing machine. 
—Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory</EPI> 
 
<EPI>As the case of nuclear strategy makes clear, there was no straightforward 
way of adding the mind back into questions of rationality. The appeal of the 
algorithmic definition of rationality was precisely that it avoided the messes that 
ensued when one attempted to account for the fact that decision makers had 
personalities, histories, and prejudices. 
—Paul Erickson et al., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind</EPI> 
  
 
<FL>Recent Cold War historiography has demonstrated how military security concerns drove 
the development of decision technologies such as game theory, bounded rationality, operations 
research, and systems analysis.1 Recollecting such history is important because it enables us to 
see how these decision theories—game theory in particular—were well-suited to the logistics 
and strategy of conflict. In their reliance on computational techniques that abandon the need for a 
conscious subject, prominent decision-theoretic tools sharply broke with previous understandings 
of human reasoning. Under these new frameworks, neither the agents modeled nor the analysts 
using the models need an intelligible grasp of the problems they are solving in order to identify 
solutions. The mindless strategic rationality of game theory came to define the nuclear security 
dilemma and, as this chapter argues, is profoundly entangled with the strategic posture it 
recommends.</FL> 
Nuclear strategy is ostensibly more effective the less intelligible it is to observers because 
deterrent threats achieve credibility at the price of absurdly endangering constituents with 
apocalyptic terror. Far from the popular conception of the public and journalists, the nuclear 
strategy sanctioned by game theory is not MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), but rather NUTS 
(Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection), referring to a nuclear war-fighting posture.2 Whereas 
MAD is structured to symmetrically hold nuclear weapons in reserve to multilaterally counter a 
nuclear attack, NUTS entails developing asymmetric advantage based on coercive bargaining, 
threatening to introduce nuclear warheads into conflict, and preparing to achieve escalation 
dominance at all levels of engagement. The mindless quality of game theory is useful in nuclear 
security because, according to strategic rationality, credible deterrence depends on preparing and 
intending to wage an omnicidal nuclear war, an action that would strike the casual subject as not 
only recklessly immoral but also pointless. Thus, the fact that strategic rationality jettisons 
  
intelligibility, or understanding of the problem it aims to solve, enables it to rationalize 
mobilizing and maintaining resources for ends that defy both moral reasoning and purposive 
action. This alienating logic of unintentional, and not necessarily intelligible, choice informing 
nuclear deterrence has been elevated to the standard understanding of classical western 
instrumental rationality, with detrimental consequences. Such strategic rationality now informs 
modeling and decision-making spanning from nonhuman actors to individuals’ choices and 
collective action, including the exercise of national sovereignty. 
Section one introduces recent historiography to show how Cold War strategic 
rationality—also referred to as rational deterrence, game theory, and rational choice—erased the 
role of understanding, or a thinking subject, in rational decision-making. This 
reconceptualization of rational choice foreclosed on the idea of informed citizens who participate 
in a process of democratic will formation to oversee executive decisions. Section two 
investigates the entanglement of the content of game theory with the nuclear security posture it 
recommends. The substance of game theory grounds nuclear strategy, finding that the most 
effective form of deterrence is to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war. Section three 
investigates how prominent social theorists use game theory as a way to unify our understanding 
of decision-making across actors, encompassing biological organisms, persons, and collectives. 
Corporate agency, the artificial product of collective action, has been subject to theorization at 
least since Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. Game theory, which served dual Cold War roles of 
grounding nuclear deterrence and rethinking the intellectual bases of democratic governance and 
free markets, offers a way to model and enact corporate agency without the need for actors to be 
aware of their role in realizing inferred joint goals.3 Given the limited view of agency and choice 
offered by strategic rationality, this general acceptance of game theory as a tool for institutional 
design and public policy formation treats individuals as intentionless subjects and governance as 
  
a technocratic exercise of steering equilibrium outcomes through the introduction of appropriate 
incentives.4 The conclusion counters contemporary complacency over game theory and atomic 
warfare, emphasizing that both strategic rationality and the US nuclear weapons program are 
more entrenched than ever.5 As this paper shows, game theory’s demotion of decision-making, 
whether individual or collective, to intentionless action makes it theoretically consistent for 
nations to prepare omnicidal measures to engage in nuclear combat in which they can only 
achieve their end by perpetually threatening, or actualizing, the complete destruction of 
humanity. The alternative is to invest in intentional decision-procedures that sustain individual 
rationality and interpersonal social commitments that insist on intelligibility as a criterion of 
purposive agency. 
 
<HDA>How Rationality Lost Its Mind</HDA> 
<FL>Nuclear deterrence, as a topic of analysis, is typically left to experts. During the early years 
of the Cold War, the ground for strategic expertise shifted from seasoned military commanders 
to blackboard consultants with mastery of abstract decision theory.6 Although their decision-
theoretic tools encompassed operations research, linear programming, and cost-benefit analysis, 
the most articulated coherent decision theory was game theory, formalized by John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.7 
Game theory spans both strategic rationality, which refers to individualistically vying against 
others to achieve one’s aims, and a theory of expected utility, which provides a technique to 
build exhaustive single-scale rankings of outcomes.8 A rational actor must know how to 
consistently exhibit preferences over whether, for example, she prefers to travel to London, 
Singapore, or Cairo in all pairwise comparisons. Her choices must also be consistent over lottery 
tickets, such as making a rational choice between visiting Singapore for sure, or receiving a 20 
  
percent chance of going to London and an 80 percent chance of traveling to Cairo. Game theory 
puts forward a comprehensive explanatory, normative, and prescriptive theory of rational choice 
that could be integrated into systems analysis and operations research, as well as a distinctive and 
well-codified body of mathematics.9</FL> 
The embrace of game theory had a defining impact on Cold War strategy and social 
science writ large. First, without knowledge of rational decision theory, or rational deterrence 
theory, it has been difficult to contribute to or influence debates over nuclear strategy. By the 
1970s, nuclear deterrence was synonymous with strategic rationality, which included the 
calculated use of probabilistic decision-making.10 Second, the concept of action proposed by 
game theory, mandatory individualistic strategic competition, became the widely accepted 
standard for purposive action throughout American social science and the professional programs 
of law, public policy, and business by the 1980s.11 There is no widely accepted alternative for 
formalizing instrumental rationality, and strategic rationality is notorious for not leaving room 
for other approaches, such as the deliberative approach of Jürgen Habermas or various forms of 
collective intention.12 The reconceptualization of theories of markets and governance according 
to game theory undermined essential pieces of once-conventional wisdom, such as the rationality 
of voting and voluntary collective action.13 Third, rational deterrence theory, which is at best 
amoral, and potentially even immoral, provided the means to “think the unthinkable,” to use the 
phrase of Herman Kahn.14 This meant matter-of-factly and routinely contemplating the exercise 
of nuclear threats in the form of flexible-response, lower-yield, first-strike weapons or second-
strike counterforce without regard for the intrinsic value of human life.15 Thus, fourth, the sense 
of urgency which rationalizes nuclear deterrence and the command-and-control structure it 
necessitates supported a theory of agency and intelligence that in principle leaves no distinction 
between human beings and artificial intelligences.16 Philip Mirowski makes this point repeatedly: 
  
“Because the computer so readily trespasses upon the self-image of man as the thinking animal, 
it has become equally commonplace to believe that the mind is nothing more than a machine; 
that is, it operates like a computer.”17 
Although the first three points have been addressed to varying degrees in the literature, 
the last point, and its particular poignancy with respect to nuclear deterrence, remains 
unexplored. The oblivious character of rational choice permeates the nuclear security state at all 
levels of function, from justifying nuclear doctrine and theories of collective choice to 
normalizing a specific form of rational action and rendering politics the unintended outcome of 
individuals’ preference satisfaction. Hence, blind steering predicated on formulaic maximization 
of expected utility rationalizes nuclear strategy despite its unintelligibility to the population it 
allegedly, although not actually, secures from harm. 
Game theorists pursue “the quest for algorithmic rationality . . . the complete and 
consistent calculation of the strategies of the opponent.”18 A benefit of this seamless transition 
from human to machine actors is that the maintenance of command and control could be 
decentralized, and in principle could be distilled to “a complete set of instructions that tells every 
individual what to do in every conceivable circumstance” that could be executed even without a 
consciously present human decision-maker.19 Thus, in erasing the line demarcating a consciously 
present decider with Kantian autonomy, and in postulating that insofar as people think, 
strategize, and calculate, so can computers, it then became possible to build a complex, 
diversified, and extended command-and-control network that would carry the burden of 
prosecuting modern warfare.20 The newly minted strategic actor obeys a structure of agency 
limited by the consistency conditions characterizing rational choice theory.21 Rationality 
becomes algorithmic. Computer simulations of action and causal implications replaced 
  
experimentation, and military command-and-control needs led to the “diffusion of the computer 
throughout all levels of military command structure.”22 
Despite the plethora of research on the entanglement of game theory with Cold War 
nuclear strategy, mainstream economics and social science more broadly continue to rely on 
rational choice theory without examining this rich intellectual and contextual heritage.23 This 
oversight neglects the potential synergy between game theory and conflict, thus proliferating a 
model for action that is best suited to antagonistic encounters. However, the development of and 
fascination with strategic rationality is inseparable from the continued US embrace of nuclear 
weapons at the apex of its military and strategy of full-spectrum dominance.24 Strategic 
rationality loses the quality of mind, or the characteristic of intelligible grasp of the problem it is 
harnessed to solve. The very credibility of nuclear deterrence depends on demonstrating the 
intention and capability to fight and win a nuclear war among superpowers, even though such 
victory is impossible due to the cataclysmic destructive power of these weapons. Indeed, the 
United States and Russian Federation have thousands of thermonuclear bombs when a war 
fought with even only one hundred could, or even much less is likely to, end known civilization. 
This provocative stance furthermore entails privileging preparing for, and hence rendering more 
plausible, nuclear war rather than countering the risks of accidental or intentional nuclear war 
and pursing means to rescind the use of thermonuclear bombs.25 Game theory, in other words, 
helps to normalize a nuclear security state in which a “nuclear eternity” is preferable to actively 
negating the historically demonstrated tendency to, sooner or later, employ deadly technologies 
on hand. Hence rational choice rationalizes that we all live under, and strategists contribute to, a 
regime that permanently equates security to living with the doomsday clock at under three 
minutes to midnight.26 Thousands of nuclear weapons remain on an unceasing alert status that 
  
will only be abrogated by either the launching of these weapons or a comprehensive rethinking 
of the logic underlying this exercise of national power.27 
By discounting the role of anxiety-ridden nuclear nightmares as a primary background to, 
and motive underlying, strategic rationality, we fail to come to terms with how profoundly the 
practice of nuclear deterrence, informed by and justifying game theory, continues to shape the 
cognitive landscape of human geopolitical and economic systems.28 Thus with every passing 
year, we further embrace a concept of intelligence that accepts mindless computation and 
automates social interactions alongside the pedestrian normalization of nuclear weapons with 
unfathomable destructive potential.29 Accommodating nuclear weapons relies on algorithmic 
decision technologies for rationalizing deterrence, and on hybrid AI-human agency to maintain 
national sovereignty through command-and-control systems during nuclear war wherein 
casualties likely will interrupt human command chains and communication channels.30 Both 
computable rationality and hybrid AI-human decision-making systems deviate from privileging a 
sovereign human subject, instead turning to algorithmic rule-following punctuated by 
randomized number generation to ground strategy and carry out commands. So important did 
defense analysts estimate the significance of command-and-control that it received an additional 
90 billion US dollars over and above the 100 billion that were concurrently spent on military 
hardware throughout the Cold War years.31 
Erickson et al.’s volume documents the far-reaching transformation during the Cold War 
of what had formerly been human reason, which connoted a role for consciousness and possibly 
even a soul in animating decision-making. The authors observe: 
 
<EXT>In the two decades following World War II, human reason was 
reconceptualized as rationality. Philosophers, mathematicians, economists, 
  
political scientists, military strategists, computer scientists, and psychologists 
sought, defined, and debated new norms for “rational actors,” a deliberately 
capacious category that included business firms, chess players, the mafia, 
computers, parents and children, and nuclear superpowers.32</EXT> 
 
<FL>Rationality, in other words, became synonymous with what had formerly been deemed the 
lowest level of cognition: routine calculation. Whereas during the Enlightenment and up until the 
Cold War, reason had referred to evaluative judgments and the formation of ideas, with the 
innovation of game theory, rationality merely came to connote calculation subject to rules.33 
These rules, also referred to as algorithms, could be followed by low-level human workers or 
even machines. Initially, it seemed to 1940s contemporaries that even permitting calculation to 
be conducted by low-paid laborers denigrated “calculation from a mindful to a mindless 
exercise.”34 However, with the embrace of game theory, following a rule, with definitive and 
predictable machine-like exactness, came to be the hallmark of rationality. There is no need for a 
subject with intelligible grasp of the significance of the instructions or their legitimacy. 
Moreover, the instructions are self-executing in the sense that they ideally specify a singular (or 
randomized) outcome independent of the faculties of the computor.35 Unaccounted for and 
rendered obsolete is the sense of cognizance that could invent rules, understand them, and apply 
them to diverse and yet unknown circumstances. This ingenuity typified, for example, Immanuel 
Kant’s attempt to establish rules to differentiate between art and technique, or Isaac Newton’s 
discovery of the rules of motion that then could serve as models for understanding mass, 
momentum, and energy.36 Thus, rule-following becomes the mindless and exacting execution of 
a set of instructions, with the rule itself reduced to an algorithm.37</FL> 
  
Rationality loses mindfulness, or a conscious subject with intelligible and existential 
grasp of the problems it solves.38 This foreclosure on the merits of understanding represents one 
side of an enduring philosophical divide over whether mind and intelligibility play any causal 
role in actualizing behavior. Whereas some theorists argue that humans exhibit freedom of will 
in making deliberate choices, game theorists put forward a theory of rationality that is wholly 
determined by a set of instructions, or an algorithm, that is enacted as causal process.39 This 
renders intelligence, or purposive agency, in principle subject to automated computation in 
carbon- or silicon-based systems. This has the added benefit, as game theory textbook authors 
Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa observe, of making rational decision-making achievable by 
human or artificial intelligence.40 
The definitive aspect of such algorithmic rule-following is its exacting production, over 
and again, of precisely the same outcome for identical sets of input data. This is the opposite of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s approach to rule-following, according to which rules do not by 
themselves specify the outcome of their application.41 John Searle, who explicitly acknowledges 
his philosophical affinity to Wittgenstein, challenges both the classical model of rationality 
encompassing game theory and the view that AI performs intelligence on par with human 
agents.42 In differentiating between human and machine intelligence, he sides with Wittgenstein 
in pointing out the importance of mindful judgment, based on understanding of intelligibility and 
recognition of veracity. In contrast, promoters of rational choice and game theory view 
rationality as one concept, whether exhibited by a human, a nonhuman organism, or a machine. 
Insofar as game theory represents the orthodox statement of instrumental rationality, Alan 
Turing’s conceptualization of intelligence has prevailed.43 According to the Church-Turing 
thesis, there are four criteria of programmable rationality.44 First, it can be stipulated by a finite 
set of precise instructions stated in a finite set of symbols. Second, if executed without error, it 
  
always produces the same result in a limited number of steps. Third, it can be completed by a 
human without machine assistance. Fourth, and most significantly, no intelligible grasp or 
understanding of the instructions is necessary for the one who calculates.45 Procedures meeting 
these criteria are deemed to be logically and mechanically computable.46 
Cold War rationality was integrally connected to military problem solving. George 
Dantzig’s linear programming, which was mathematically equivalent to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s two-person, zero-sum game theory, was developed to solve military logistics 
problems such as the Berlin Airlift operation.47 Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory 
was used to provide solutions for military duels and other strategic problems, including nuclear 
brinkmanship and escalation in the Vietnam War.48 Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality was 
applied to resource allocation problems.49 According to Erickson et al., “[Herman] Kahn [author 
of On Thermonuclear War] believed that everything about nuclear war could be understood 
using the core principles of rational-choice theory.”50 Not only did Thomas Schelling rely on the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game to develop his theoretical defense of mutual assured destruction, but 
other Cold War intellectuals working at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency also used 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma to model Nixon’s dilemma of whether or not to escalate in Vietnam, and 
to structure bargaining during conflict and over weapons in arms control.51 
Herman Kahn, whose NUTS position on nuclear deterrence prevailed by 1980 and still 
governs US policy, believed that “axiomatic, formalized rationality was the only way to prepare 
for the vicissitudes of conflict.”52 Even though RAND’s staff grew disenchanted with game 
theory for its failure to generate a science of warfare by the 1960s, the Pentagon still established 
the Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency dedicated to gaming simulations to analyze how 
conflicts may be prosecuted.53 In 1977, RAND analyst Jack Snyder wrote a report identifying the 
American national security state as a quintessential rational actor.54 Nuclear strategists modeled 
  
deterrence itself using game theory, and the body of thought comprising it was and remains 
strategic rationality.55 Game theory thus provided decision makers with a means of making 
onerous policy decisions without emotion, context, and even moral judgment or ethical principle 
and understanding.56 Without the military decision-making context to sponsor the initial 
development of game theory to solve logistical and strategic problems, it is unlikely that rational 
choice theory would have eventually won over economists who, although skeptical at first, were 
by the 1980s among its greatest proponents, contributing to its preeminence in the American 
social sciences by the 1980s.57 Possibly their enthusiasm followed from their propensity to 
believe that market coordination arises without actors’ intentional effort to achieve mutual 
prosperity or equilibrium. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern formalized game theory to be an all-encompassing 
science of choice, applicable to every decision in all conceivable circumstances throughout the 
lifetime of rational agents.58 Every consideration of worth, insofar as it impinges on choice, can 
be, the authors insist, encapsulated into this formalism. Strategic rationality is perfect to capture 
“calmly aggressive selfishness.”59 Game theory, as a decision technology, only recognizes that 
consequences matter and demands that only individualistic competition is rational.60 Therefore, 
only outcomes, and not principled or ethical means, matter to decision-makers.61 Even if 
individuals can form coalitions to compete against other actors, once spoils are obtained, every 
group must disintegrate into individuals who compete among each other. Although game theory 
promises to deliver a “crystalline definiteness, generality, and conclusiveness” with which to 
define rational action, it can only guarantee single solutions in contexts of zero-sum 
competition.62 In a non-zero-sum game with multiple possible equilibria, rational actors would 
no longer have a clear template for action that results in predictable outcomes. To address this 
obvious limitation, game theorists consider repeating interactions in which a history of 
  
engagement may enable actors to reach a Nash equilibrium: a single point outcome from which 
no single actor has any incentive to diverge given the choices that all other actors made. 
Wittingly or not, by reducing agency to mindless action, game theorists end up endorsing 
these characteristic limitations. Rules and norms are not deemed to guide action, but rather to 
merely describe behavioral regularities.63 We need to ask how our dominant form of social 
science and public policy analysis has so roundly accepted that purposive agency can dispense 
with the meaning of action as a primary motivator.64 The fact that we use this theory of 
rationality to inform our nuclear security policy and to solve the challenge of credible deterrence 
is inseparable from social scientists’ and policy analysts’ embrace of its potential to explain all 
human action, individual and collective. It is no coincidence that the theory of rationality 
governing the US nuclear arsenal under the nuclear war fighting protocol is also the template for 
rational action used to inform individual and collective action, as well as theories of sovereign 
decision-making. As a unified theory of action, strategic rationality accounts for the most prosaic 
choices and the most consequential: to engage in nuclear combat. 
 
<HDA>MAD, NUTS, and Game Theory</HDA> 
<FL>Whereas strategic rationality elides the need for an agent who deliberately makes decisions, 
nuclear war raises numerous existential quandaries. In particular, the now ever-present potential 
for nuclear war rewrites the social contract between citizens and government. Daniel Deudney 
argues that after World War II, the modern social contract predicated on the state’s ability to take 
its citizens out of harm’s way was only able to maintain the appearance of legitimacy given the 
impossibility of realizing this promise.65 The state achieves such an appearance by downplaying 
the role of nuclear weapons in projecting state power and giving citizens the false impression 
that its nuclear program is oriented toward an anti-nuclear goal.66 Whereas most sectors of even 
  
US civil society are under the impression that nuclear policy has been and is structured to the end 
of deterring nuclear war consistent with a policy, and the reality of, mutual assured destruction 
(MAD), its actual policy stance is, in fact, NUTS. Deudney notices that which has otherwise 
gone unrecognized: “the doctrine of mutual assured destruction gradually became supplemental 
and then supplanted by nuclear utilization targeting theory and strategies—known among nuclear 
strategists as . . . NUTS.”67 The reality of NUTS—i.e., the US preparedness to engage in all 
levels of nuclear combat regardless of the risks of error, accident, cyber hacking, proliferation, 
and escalation—is not made manifestly clear to the public because this would erode the 
remaining legitimacy from the social contract.68 Not only does government hold citizens hostage 
as the potential casualties of the failure of nuclear brinkmanship, but the momentum of the 
state’s nuclear program also proliferates the risk of nuclear engagement far beyond the outcome 
that would result from jointly and progressively reducing nuclear capabilities and attenuating 
their alert status.</FL> 
There are four bodies of literature that provide evidence that nuclear deterrence and game 
theory are coextensive with each other, that rational deterrence theory is the same as rational 
decision theory. One is the historical record of practice and engagement.69 The second is the 
internal perspective of international relations theory that makes clear on the one hand that the 
abstract formal theory of rational deterrence is game theory and on the other that the war gaming 
simulations used to make arguments for different strategies were game-based models and 
simulations that were indistinguishable from how actual scenarios would be handled.70 Third is 
the literature of strategic practice that provides retrospective vision, making clear the extent to 
which the problem of deterrence was viewed in terms of strategic rationality.71 Fourth, and 
finally, strategic rationality developed in conjunction with theoretically exploring problems of 
nuclear deterrence, most importantly the credibility problem.72 
  
Schelling’s Strategy of Conflict is important to all four bodies of literature. Those who 
follow his lead modeled the nuclear security dilemma and arms race using the recalcitrant 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.73 Within the context of strategic arms control, as addressed by the US 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “the prisoner’s dilemma did become a key theoretical 
framework for thinking about ‘the problem of the bomb,’ and the game matrix could leap from 
the mathematics of optimization to psychological laboratories to problems of war and peace writ 
large.”74 The significance of this is twofold. On the one hand, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, 
which was originally developed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Drescher at RAND to reflect two 
prisoners who are each given the choice by a jailor to confess or remain silent, seemed apt to 
capture the problem of the “Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack,” and an arms race.75 However, 
on the other hand, the fact that hard-nosed strategic rationality led to an unambiguously 
suboptimal result in this game signified a deep puzzle at the core of game theory.76 Given their 
inability to intentionally collaborate, rational actors achieve suboptimal, and therefore 
inscrutable, results. 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a district attorney gives two inmates suspected of having 
committed a crime each two choices: to remain silent, or to confess. Four possible outcomes 
obtain, depending on the inmates’ individual choices of what to do. If both remain silent, they 
both serve a short sentence. If both confess, they both serve a long sentence. If one confesses and 
the other remains silent, then the confessor goes free while the one who remains silent serves a 
lifetime sentence. In orthodox game theory, the moral of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that each 
individual is better off defecting, regardless of what the other decides to do. Thus both achieve a 
worse outcome (a long jail sentence) than if they had been able to cooperate (shorter sentences). 
If the other remains silent, then it is better to confess, thereby achieving freedom. If the other 
  
confesses, then it is still better to confess to save oneself from the worst outcome of lifetime 
imprisonment (Table 6.1). 
 
      Joe 
      Silent      Talk 
Bob   Silent  
   Talk 
 
Table 6.1: Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Applied to the Cold War, either in terms of the preemptive fear of surprise attack (Table 
6.2) or a nuclear arms race (Table 6.3), each country is better off pursuing unilateral success, 
because this secures at best dominance and at worst mutual ruin rather than singular defeat. As 
the analysis goes, in an arms race, regardless of what the USSR does, the US is better off 
building arms without limit, because this will either grant it supremacy or prevent it from being 
dominated. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma both actors seek unilateral advantage, securing the worst 
possible outcome for the other agent. These preferences are consistent with an aggressor or 
revisionist state.77 
 
      USSR 
      Defend        Attack 
US   Defend 
   Attack 
 
  1 year, 1 year  life in jail, freedom 
  freedom, life in jail  10 years, 10 years 
  security, security  surrender, victory 
  victory, surrender destruction, destruction 
  
Table 6.2: Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack (see, e.g., Schelling, Strategy of Conflict) 
 
      USSR 
      Disarm        Arm 
US   Disarm 
   Arm 
 
Table 6.3: Nuclear Arms Race (see, e.g., Campbell and Sowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and 
Cooperation) 
 
<FL>However, few seem to have asked whether an endless nuclear arms race, such as what the 
US has pursued even after the Cold War ended, makes sense, unless it is both possible to achieve 
military supremacy and meaningful to exercise it. Similarly, with respect to actually waging war, 
experts note that the US strategic policy meets the specifics of striving to realize being “a 
nuclear-armed state . . . planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by 
disarming enemies [including Russia with its seven thousand nuclear warheads] with a surprise 
first strike.”78</FL> 
Game theorists originally argued that one possible way out of the reciprocal fear of 
surprise attack is to ensure a second-strike counterattack that would neutralize the adversary’s 
advantage with what would end up being mutual assured destruction.79 The hope is that issuing a 
threat of counterattack, or the certainty of mutual assured destruction, will be sufficient to secure 
safety from nuclear attack. However, given the severity of the nuclear threat and the fact that all 
that would remain for the preemptively attacked power is to issue a counterattack amid the ashes 
of destruction, game theorists worried that issuing a credible threat of retaliation is as impossible 
   peace, peace submission, dominance 
 dominance, submission  precarity, precarity 
  
as counting on the two prisoners to follow through on promises to remain silent. In each case, 
actors’ actual interests diverge from their promises or threats, rendering both incredible: I 
promise to remain silent, but, according to game theory’s model of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, I 
really prefer to go free. I seek to deter nuclear attack and hold my arsenal in reserve to prevent 
the enemy’s attack, yet once the attack has occurred, I no longer have a reason to counterattack, 
according the game theoretic modeling. Thus, the wrenching problem of nuclear deterrence—
how to issue a credible threat of mutual destruction after deterrence has failed—was mapped into 
the conceptual space of the irresolvable Prisoner’s Dilemma paradox and explored in the related 
problems of the Toxin puzzle.80 The Prisoner’s Dilemma modeling of nuclear deterrence renders 
a nuclear war-fighting posture necessary because the only way to shore up the credibility of 
deterrence is to perpetually threaten to wage nuclear war with the aim to win.81 
In this thought experiment designed by Gregory Kavka, a being with acute predictive 
powers offers the protagonist one million dollars if she can form an intention today to drink a 
vial of toxin tomorrow that will cause no long-term harm but would make her feel terribly ill for 
one day. The supernatural being offers a large sum of money if she can promise, and follow 
through on that promise, to drink nonlethal poison, even if the money is already in her bank 
account prior to the act of drinking. No matter how many times theorists investigated this puzzle, 
they could not identify a means by which the rational person could form an intention at time t1 to 
perform an action at time t2 that would be costly at that time and simultaneously would serve no 
function in promoting the protagonist’s goals. Why would the rational agent actually follow 
through on drinking the toxin after the million dollars is already in the bank? Kavka initially 
reached that conclusion, and David Gauthier similarly reached the same conclusion a few years 
later.82 Both saw this thought experiment as equivalent to that of nuclear deterrence in the 
context of issuing an “apocalyptic threat.”83 
  
The toxin puzzle has a similar logical structure to the Prisoner’s Dilemma as it relates to 
nuclear deterrence. Forming a credible threat to retaliate with a devastating second strike is an 
intention that at the time of acting would both be repugnant and serve no instrumental role in 
furthering the agent’s goal. Thus, in terms of game theoretic analysis, no threat of mutual assured 
destruction is credible: What could motivate a counterstrike that would only wreak further 
damage after deterrence has already failed? Following this logic, analysts argued that the only 
way to ensure that deterrence is credible is to integrate it into a plan to prevail in nuclear war at 
all levels of engagement.84 This is consistent with the position of escalation dominance in which 
the US seeks to have sufficient nuclear capability to win on any rung on the escalation ladder of 
potential conflict. The fact that game theory was designed to be computable and demands that its 
instructions for action in principle lack intelligibility to agents carrying them out is well-suited to 
legitimize nuclear strategy without any need for the actual comprehension of that strategy. This 
possibly underlies the reality that citizens, who may resist endorsing an unintelligible nuclear 
procurement and deployment posture, are largely left in the dark about US nuclear policy, 
naively believing that MAD prevails—i.e., that nuclear weapons are on hand to deter attack, and 
not to vie for dominance.85 
It is not yet clear why the policy of flexible response, or being the first to deploy nuclear 
weapons prior to their introduction into arenas of conflict by hostile parties, need be invoked 
given the US’s dominance in conventional forces.86 According to NUTS strategic doctrine, 
however, in flagrant disregard for the “nuclear taboo,” holding that nuclear weapons are 
categorically different from conventional arms and should remain off the table on a first-use 
basis, the US should build small tactical nuclear weapons to be launched in lesser conflicts, thus 
introducing nuclear weapons in an otherwise conventional war.87 This strategic stance of flexible 
response, although consistent with Kahn’s escalation dominance and preparedness to fight to win 
  
nuclear combat of any scale conceivable, outright contradicts the position of maintaining nuclear 
weapons only for the sake of deterring a nuclear strike. Proponents of flexible response perceive 
the need to thoroughly integrate nuclear arms into the US military’s standard operating 
procedure.88 Thus, the aim of making nuclear threats credible at the highest level of nuclear 
attack and counterattack merges with assuring other nations that much less provocation could be 
met with a nuclear strike, including efforts to achieve their own deterrent posture. Hence, against 
the idea that nuclear weapons are useless, apart from hopefully serving to avoid nuclear war, 
flexible response seeks to keep them as an option perpetually on the table either to directly strike 
terror into, or to signal the US’s willingness to engage in nuclear war to, potential adversaries, 
with the overall aim of compelling them to acquiesce to US demands.89 
Political maneuvering to appease domestic political supporters by projecting strength, 
and business interests associated with the nuclear weapons industry, may both contribute to the 
US’s reliance on nuclear weapons in its security protocol. However, rational deterrence theory is 
at least equally complicit. There are, of course, exceptions: Thomas Schelling, Robert Jervis, and 
Steven Brams deserve recognition as experts who were fluent in game theory but supported a 
deterrent position consistent with respecting the nuclear taboo and hoping to gradually reduce 
nuclear arsenals in staged rounds of reciprocal arms reduction under conditions of mutual 
surveillance.90 However, from the perspective of pure strategic rationality, the position of using 
nuclear threats only to counter nuclear aggression and the aim of reducing arms to a reciprocated 
minimum deterrent stance have not been successfully sustained within rational choice theory. 
The position which has prevailed is unmistakably NUTS. Deudney captures the essence 
of this view, which he calls nuclear strategism, in his 2007 book Bounding Power: 
 
  
<EXT>This view takes states as given, conflict as endemic, and holds that the 
quintessential state activity of preparing for and making war defines world 
politics regardless of the type of weaponry prevalent. Nuclear strategism 
postulates that states seeking security in a nuclear world will—and should—
prepare themselves to exercise a full range of nuclear use options and seek to gain 
political advantage from relatively small differences in nuclear force 
levels.91</EXT> 
 
<FL>He sketches out four possible deterrence positions: disarmament, automatic deterrence, 
institutional deterrence, and the assertive stance of escalation dominance, which he calls nuclear 
strategism. According to strategic rationality, which is presented as a comprehensive and all-
inclusive theory of rational choice, the lack of credibility of following through on a deterrent 
threat requires demonstrating the capability and intention to wage nuclear war. Additional 
features of nuclear strategism, also known as NUTS, include manipulating opponents’ perception 
of the risk of nuclear war for various actions, and limited nuclear options, both of which violate a 
no first use pledge. Originally, forgoing the assurance of renouncing first use served to deter a 
Soviet land invasion into Europe. However, now that US conventional arms are deemed 
sufficient to the task, the US still reserves the prerogative of first use because doing otherwise 
would maintain the categorical separation of nuclear weapons from conventional weapons.92 
This would result in the same problem: without constant announcement of the preparedness and 
capability to resort to nuclear warfare, deterrence—or, similarly, the power to compel others to 
comply with the state’s demands—would lack credibility. Similarly, with the goals of achieving 
escalation dominance in any conflict or engaging in coercive bargaining to negotiate settlements, 
the state relies on its ability to threaten harm. Actors are motivated to avoid harm because it is 
  
directly contrary to their interests. The overall strategy of developing and maintaining the 
physical and institutional infrastructure to perpetuate nuclear threats itself need not be and is not 
intelligible because it interminably risks the existence of all human life. However, demanding 
intelligibility requires exiting the framework of strategic rationality and heeding that meaning, 
understanding, and recognition can provide reasons and causes for action.</FL> 
 
<HDA>From a Unified Social Ontology to a Unified World Order</HDA> 
<FL>Although game theory’s roots of application lie in the nuclear dilemma, in the subsequent 
decades, theorists have used strategic rationality to explain all levels of agency, from the 
biological and human to the corporate and sovereign. Theorists posit that all coherent purposive 
agency must obey the dictates of rational choice. The state, originally analyzed by Thomas 
Hobbes as an artificial person or Leviathan, is now formally modeled as the outcome of rational 
self-interest expressed in markets and politics.93 In particular, the contemporary American state 
becomes a nuclearized Leviathan whose greatest purview of decision-making, that exerting the 
most singular impact on life planetwide, is how and when to project power using nuclear arms. 
Power, in such a situation, can be understood as the ability to influence others’ actions by issuing 
devastating and credible threats of harm. The rational choice approach to politics, collective 
action, and warfare is realist in the sense that it shuns moralizing justification of action, rather 
deferring to the unbridled strategic pursuit of ends.94 This realism permeates the analytic decision 
technology of strategic rationality itself because it promotes an understanding and practice of 
communication that denies intention, meaning, and intelligibility. Instead, communication 
becomes a science of signaling asymmetric information of what world states obtain, and 
calculating whether costly signals or cheap talk, true or false, best achieves actors’ goals.95</FL> 
  
In their conclusion to How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind, Erickson et al. propose that 
worries about nuclear security have receded hand-in-hand with the abandonment of mindless 
rationality.96 However, just as the nuclear security dilemma remains as pressing as during any 
time of the Cold War, rationality has never been as mindless as in the first two decades of the 
twentieth-first century.97 Now strategic rationality not only provides a tool for decision-making 
in national security and logistical planning, as well as a paradigm for rational action, but also 
serves as a means to provide a unifying logic of action that spans across all levels and types of 
agency. Thus, rational decision theory is applied to evolving organisms, cognition, language, 
individual agency, collective agency, hybrid systems of human and robotic actors, formal and 
informal institutions, and arriving at sovereign decisions. The theorist Fancesco Guala refers to 
this broad application of rational choice as a “unified social ontology.”98 Economist Herbert 
Gintis claims that game theory unifies the behavioral sciences, which encompass both animal 
and human behavior.99 Rather than being a relic of the past, robotic rationality has become so 
normal that those promoting alternative forms of reason—Wittgensteinian rule-following, 
commitment to principles as opposed to only being incentivized by outcomes, solidarity and 
team reasoning, shared intention, and virtue-inspired action, for example—must persistently 
advocate to maintain these heterodox actions’ academic relevance. The greatest prospective 
casualties are mind, intention, and intelligibility. 
The paradigm of computational rationality comfortably sustains the position that mind is 
an illusion that will gradually fall away.100 Some urge us to grasp that we are in the midst of a 
fourth revolution. Just as humans’ beliefs that the earth is in the center of the universe, and that 
humans are of a different order of creation than animals, have given way, so too will our view 
that we are categorically distinct from artificial intelligence.101 However, as soon as we settled on 
using strategic rationality as a template for human intelligence, we already conceded that the 
  
conscious presence of a decision-maker with comprehension of the meaning of actions is 
irrelevant to rational choice.102 Furthermore, insofar as this model of rationality presents a 
normative standard, it accepts the premise that subjects need have no comprehension of how 
following the rules they are incentivized to follow serves the purpose of coordinating their 
actions for mutual benefit.103 Rules, alternatively called equilibria by game theorists, are no 
longer motivating reasons for action. Instead, they reflect regularities of action caused by 
individuals’ automatic preference satisfaction. 
The titles of two recent papers convey the trend toward viewing the brain as an organ 
functioning on par with a computer: “Computational Rationality: Linking Mechanism and 
Behavior through Bounded Utility Maximization” and “Computational Rationality: A 
Converging Paradigm for Intelligence in Brains, Minds, and Machines.”104 This branch of 
research, referred to as computational rationality, uses expected utility theory as the basis for 
how organisms, including people, register external states of the world in brain states.105 Life 
forms are further postulated to have probability estimates of the likelihood of various action-
dependent outcomes and act as “information-processing mechanisms by selecting an optimal 
program for a bounded machine that maximizes utility in some environment.”106 According to a 
broad review of this new field published in Science, “the fields of artificial intelligence (AI), 
cognitive science, and neuroscience are reconverging on a shared view of the computational 
foundations of intelligence.”107 Along the same lines, economist Herbert Gintis argues that game 
theory can explain action all the way down to the way that cognition functions. He observes that 
“expected utility maximization is not simply an ‘as if’ story” because “neuroscientists 
increasingly find that an aggregate decision making process in the brain synthesizes all available 
information into a single unitary value.”108 These scientific results, and interpretations of them, 
remain tentative, but at the same time reflect how the Cold War view of rationality maintains its 
  
currency and continues to blur artificial and human intelligence, relegating subjective 
understanding of the meaning of acts and events to insignificance.109 
Game theory has become ubiquitous as an explanatory tool. Game theoretic modeling has 
been applied extensively in evolutionary biology, and lessons learned from these models have 
been used to draw conclusions about the possibility of and basis for human cooperation.110 Game 
theoretic accounts of individual human and collective action are integrated into public policy.111 
Rational choice theory informs the applied schools of law and economics, public choice, and 
institutional design.112 Game theory has also been extensively applied in international relations 
theory spanning nuclear deterrence and hegemonic stability theory, to analyzing treaties as cheap 
talk insofar as they are not enforceable.113 
As a method, game theory simply offers a means to model, and possibly predict, political 
and economic phenomena. However, from the time of its founding, game theory also stood as a 
normative theory of rational choice with prescriptive implications for individual and collective 
decision-making.114 Thus, if, as its advocates propose, game theory is both a normatively valid 
theory of instrumental action and a descriptively informative account of agency, then it is not 
surprising that game theorists find it possible to conceive of all levels of agency, from the 
nonhuman biological to individual and collective action to superordinate action of organized 
groups including companies and states, and hybrid human-AI systems, as each embodying the 
same tenets of rational action.115 However, the question is to what extent descriptive modeling of 
agency and normative theories of agency could influence the performative dimension of action. 
This question can be addressed in depth by focusing on various levels of agency: (1) individual 
action; (2) large-scale collective action; (3) human agency within institutions designed using (a) 
analytic rational choice and (b) behavioral experiments that rely on orthodox game theory to 
  
provide a template for perfectly rational conduct; and (4) sovereign bodies which are structured 
to conform to the theoretical results learned from rational choice modeling. 
Game theorists address all these expressions of agency with their singular model for 
action.116 Modeling individual competition, collective action, and institutions as games is staple 
in rational choice. More interesting for purposes here is the application of rational choice theory 
to the sovereign function of governance, particularly by way of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.117 
Revisiting the conceptualization of the state as Leviathan, contemporary political theorists have 
used game theory to provide an analysis of the state of nature and the maintenance of social 
order offered by Hobbes.118 According to this new assessment, strategic rationality governs all 
purposive conduct and must account for the exercise of collective sovereignty from the 
micromotives of individual choice.119 Game theorists view Hobbes as a realist, finding common 
ground with him in their approach, which associates motivation with rational self-interest void of 
any types of deontological commitment or political obligation. However, Jeremy Bentham is a 
more fitting forbearer than Hobbes since the former viewed talk of rights and obligations as 
nonsense, and the latter had a complex approach to natural law, agents’ duty to abide by 
agreements made, and forging the Artificial Man or commonwealth.120 
A more in-depth inquiry is necessary to discern the nuances between Hobbes’s theory of 
sovereignty and that offered by game theory.121 Here, it is sufficient to point out that Hobbes’s 
theory bases the sovereign’s authoritative rule on individuals’ covenants with one another to lay 
down their rights to all things. Whereas Hobbes identifies gain, safety, and reputation as 
individuals’ primary, and unlikely rational, motivating forces, game theorists impute to 
individuals the all-encompassing aim of maximizing expected utility.122 Where Hobbes’s 
Leviathan depends on both subjects’ sense of allegiance in exchange for the sovereign’s promise 
of security, and the sword to threaten rule-breakers, game theorists assess individuals’ calculated 
  
gain against the cost of rule-breaking to identify the impetus underlying stable governance. For 
Hobbes, achieving the threshold of security will secure the stability of a sovereign. For rational 
choice theorists, subjects may vigilantly engage in cost-benefit analysis to determine whether to 
obey or break laws on a case-by-case basis.123 
Leaving aside individuals’ motives and choices to comply with or challenge the rule of 
law, rational choice also offers the means to both analyze and rationalize government policies. 
This is because strategic rationality is useful for both assessing what outcomes will obtain from 
individual choices, and for formalizing the conditions that must be met for collective political 
will formation to be legitimate in reflecting individuals’ interests. As is by now common lore, 
Kenneth J. Arrow’s generation of his impossibility theorem, proving the irrationality of all 
collective decision-procedures for more than two individuals selecting among three or more 
alternatives, was at least in part inspired by his early Cold War assignment of formulating an 
expected utility function conveying Soviet citizens’ preferences over nuclear war.124 The rich 
body of social choice theory that followed Arrow’s 1951 proof remains central to the design of 
voting procedures, and has been incorporated into search engines such as Google that rely on 
ranking systems to reflect multiple-criteria decision problems.125 Constitutional design has also 
been methodically studied using game theory to ascertain which fundamental principles will 
structure a society that upholds attractive conditions, such as citizens’ sovereignty, efficient use 
of resources, and egalitarian commitments.126 Thus, with respect to institutional design of 
governing bodies, rational choice theory has played a significant role in providing a means to 
analyze how to achieve desired outcomes, assuming that strategic rationality best reflects 
purposive agency. 
The particular view of collective agency offered by game theory was perfectly attuned to 
the early Cold War hostility toward organic collective action and collectivism.127 Recent 
  
literature has drawn attention to the distrust of intentionally organized collective agency, now 
referred to as conspiracy. Alfred Moore, for example, argues that Friedrich Hayek opposed social 
theories which accept the possibility of either collective rationality or intentional collective 
action.128 Orthodox game theory, which demands thoroughly individualistic interaction and 
unintended consequences, was thus a fitting social scientific methodology for followers of Hayek 
and those who sought to help maintain a liberal market order. 
Rational choice offers a comprehensive theory for legitimation. Once we accept orthodox 
game theory as the best statement of the conditions that individual and collective rational agency 
must obey, if individuals’ preferences are complete and consistent, then the only question about 
strategic interactions is what equilibrium will obtain.129 In other words, it comes down to 
whether an equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal—i.e., a state of affairs in which no single 
individual can be made better off without making anyone worse off. Individuals can be 
compelled to accept less through processes of coercive bargaining in which preemptive threats 
can incentivize actors to make concessions. Rational choice models generally accept that scarce 
tangible physical resources, as in natural social dilemmas, are interpersonally salient sources of 
value that individuals alike seek to amass or consume in competition with others.130 Orthodox 
game theory thus resonates with realism by anchoring the source of value underlying 
individuals’ preferences in concrete goods, and accepting as necessary de facto outcomes. 
Game theory likewise offers a realist approach to politics. Insofar as it claims to be an all-
encompassing theory of rational choice, it invalidates types of agency and collective 
intentionality that are inconsistent with its assumptions, such as reflexive governance based on 
voluntary rule-following to realize joint goals informed by shared meanings.131 Nuclear security 
policy is ratified by game theory three times over. First, game theory offers no means to theorize 
about legitimate collective agency other than to provide accounts of how collective will 
  
formation reflects individuals’ choices. Nuclear security policy is no different. Achieving a US 
strategic policy different from NUTS would require a different institutional arrangement, one 
which must privilege intelligibility, commitment, and reflexive governance over computable 
rationality and rational choice. Second, given that nuclear war has been modeled as a strategic 
game, this exercise offers clear guidance for action: specifically, it privileges NUTS over MAD 
as the surest means to achieve credible deterrence. This guidance follows as a computable 
solution to a “game” that requires no intelligible grasp of its validity, implications, or 
assumptions. Third, the entire command-and-control structure, which integrates human decision-
makers into a hybrid world of telecommunications, computation, and military hardware, invites 
agents to operate on a level commensurate with computable rationality. Even with a keen sense 
of oversight, anthropomorphic qualities are easily lost in humans’ contribution to a platform of 
action in which sustainability is defined as the propagation of a war plan and control over 
military operations. 
The realism underlying the sheer destructive power of existing nuclear arms is 
inseparable from the realism inherent in the game theoretic assessment of value, typically as 
fungible, interpersonally transferable utility, and its estimation of power with respect to actors’ 
ability to either directly achieve ends, or achieve ends by manipulating others’ choices with 
incentives.132 Nuclear security expert Daniel Deudney argues that the US nuclear security state 
cannot meet its basic legitimation demand, and thus it shies away from openly proclaiming its 
readiness to engage in nuclear war attendant with its bid for global nuclear supremacy.133 This 
may seem to be a distinct consideration from examining how rational choice is used to assess 
legitimacy; however, it is tightly aligned because the US security state purchases its license to act 
recklessly abroad and to violate civil liberties at home by threatening “the core of the core, the 
limited government constitution of the United States itself.”134 
  
Realism can be constructive in demystifying power relations. However, in the case of 
rational choice, strategic rationality is restrictive because it denies the coherence of alternative 
means of acting, such as commitment, intrinsic interests, and joint instrumental agency.135 This, 
in effect, ends up rationalizing the de facto exercise of power without due process that must be 
upheld by commitment to constitutional principles.136 The exigencies of nuclear deterrence and 
the nuclearized Leviathan who must channel authority to exercise a planetary death warrant and 
interface with AI systems rendering intelligibility superfluous, facilitate an expression of agency 
that must, by design, be complicit with this exercise of authority. The ground for legitimation for 
this NUTS strategy inherently forfeits guaranteeing humans security from nuclear annihilation. 
This renders denial and unintelligibility the core ingredients of maintaining the sprawling, 
resource-engulfing, and perpetually endangering nuclear security complex. 
The triumvirate of nuclear arms, strategic rationality, and hybrid command-and-control 
systems threatens constitutional order.137 One reason that the realism underlying game theory is 
insufficient to unmask this unsettling fact is that it coopts our theory of linguistic 
communication, eviscerating it of intelligibility and meaning. Instead, communication is solely 
based on a strategic platform of signaling, with calculated decisions over whether to be truthful 
or deceptive. Language itself, when serving the programmed needs of AI and information 
technologies, becomes purely syntactic with a minimal semantic bridge that associates a 
physically detectable world state, such as temperature, with a symbol, in this case a numeric 
temperature scale. This theory of language is consistent with computational rationality and its 
application to brains, as well as to integrated information processing theory.138 Runciman 
recognizes the role played by Cold War military initiatives in generating the “true roots of the 
digital revolution.”139 Also, much to the point, he quotes political theorist John Gray who notes, 
“cyberspace is a site of unceasing warfare.” Gray likewise muses that “while they are being used 
  
as weapons, electronic technologies may also be creating a terrain on which intelligent life forms 
could evolve independent of human control.”140 As game theory is developed to accommodate 
agent-based modeling in contexts of conflict and economic transactions, the transmission of 
information as the primary means of communication increases in salience. Warfare is described 
in terms of “the achievement of Information Superiority with characteristics of gross 
asymmetries and a diversity of ‘players.’”141 Strategic rationality and information theory merge 
to be pivotal in the projection of power in twenty-first century warfare. 
We must wake up to a potential threat that the rational choice revolution, wedded at the 
hip to the nuclear security state, poses in its theory of rationality that is individualistic, anchors 
utility in scarce, competitive resources, and, most importantly, denies intelligibility a role in 
judgment. A constitutional order that rests on game theory, which necessarily neglects the fact 
that “intrinsic interests” and commitments may animate actors, must by its analytic structure 
posit “rationalist, interest-based mechanisms of political behavior.”142 The realism of game 
theory, which presupposes a common world by imputing that environments afford value 
independent from and prior to sociability, ignores that human communication is predicated on 
intention and intelligibility, and that a joint social order regulated by a legitimate rule of law “is 
both a mechanism of political commitment and itself a political commitment.”143 
This treatment of communication as thoroughly strategic, which represents a recent trend 
in research into treating communication as signaling and cheap talk without implications for 
outcomes, views human actors as on par with computing devices that send signals and calculate 
whether received signals are credible or not.144 Jürgen Habermas worried that nondialogic 
market transactions threaten the life-world of human inhabitants, but even his analysis is 
insufficient to grasp the full implications of accepting a theory of agency and communication 
that is wholly strategic.145 Envisioning a vibrant potential for cultural reproduction through 
  
authentic dialogue can open our eyes to the significance of viewing rationality as mindless and 
computable, and simultaneously treating communication as reducible to strategic signaling that 
facilitates strategic action. Thus, we can be sensitive to forms of AI that “automate the social,” 
drawing humans into complexes of interaction and communication as though they are governed 
by either computable rationality or predictable habituated behavioral patterns.146 We can also 
recognize, against the reductionist realism of orthodox game theory, that an intelligible grasp of 
decision-making, which depends on recognition of validity conditions underlying truth claims 
and the acknowledgment of other like actors, could be positioned to challenge the cogency of a 
permanent nuclear Leviathan and rule of law reduced to compelling compliance with 
incentives.147 Resonating with Habermas’s critical stance, even the legal positivist H. L. A. Hart 
held that “legal validity ultimately rests on a social practice among officials (if not citizens more 
broadly) of recognizing and accepting certain rules or practices as obligatory.”148 
A unified ontology consistent with orthodox game theory legitimates a nuclear security 
stance that holds all of humanity hostage.149 This theory of action indiscriminately applies to 
animal action, human action, collective action, governance, and hybrid action systems with 
human and artificial agents. Throughout, intelligibility, intention, and commitment are jettisoned 
in favor of a simplistic protocol for action: maximizing expected utility. Its convenience for 
modeling and managing social institutions, in addition to its eschewal of collective intentionality, 
make it attractive to policy analysts and useful for structuring environments that can force people 
to reduce their own expressions of selfhood to conform to the prerogatives of AI.150 As yet, it 
remains unknown what possibilities lie in a collective rationality that embraces intelligibility, 
commitment, and shared intention. However, it is clear that strategic rational action makes it 
possible to mindlessly contribute to systems that neither place an intrinsic value on life, nor have 
any concern for whether human civilization is obliterated in a miscarriage of every individual’s 
  
natural right “to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own . . . Life; 
and consequently of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall 
conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”151 
 
<HDA>Conclusion</HDA> 
<FL>The unified social ontology of game theory, its normative clout as the dominant standard of 
rational choice, and its long-established role in policy-making underlie the contemporary world 
order in which the United States pursues escalation dominance, negates a no-first-use pledge, 
and develops flexible nuclear alternatives in the form of limited nuclear options.152 This is not to 
say that critiques of this unified social ontology and unified world order do not exist. Nye’s 
Nuclear Ethics and Deudney’s Bounding Power present views of agency and collective security 
that are not limited to strategic rationality. Nye contrasts strategic rationality with moral 
judgment. Deudney emphasizes the universal pursuit of “security from predatory violence and 
for political liberty.”153 Finding “human corporeal vulnerability and the fundamental value of life 
as prerequisite for all other ends” as a basis for common ground, he calls for a federated 
international solution to the nuclear security dilemma.154 These points all resonate as well with 
Elaine Scarry’s Thermonuclear Hegemony, which argues that legitimate government arises from 
the visceral and shared recognition of what it means to be harmed. The social contract must both 
be intelligible to its constituents and protect its members from wrongful harm to be 
legitimate.</FL> 
Thus, it shades from ludicrous to alarming that the decision technologies that were first 
developed to address nuclear security, then applied to modeling all manner of individual and 
collective decisions, and developed to construct public policies and design institutions, 
presuppose at the outset that there is no comprehending subject in the decision-maker’s seat.155 
  
The fact of mindless rationality is consistent with its design. Game theory’s prominence is 
inseparable from its generative application to the nuclear security dilemma that selected the 
strategy of NUTS—preparing to fight and win a nuclear war—as the only way to solve the 
supposed paradox of MAD deriving from the lack of credibility of a mutually suicidal retaliatory 
strike. But any fact, including the reality of mutual assured destruction, cannot be a paradox. The 
paradox of deterrence was generated internal to rational decision theory, which, having jettisoned 
intelligibility as a distinguishing feature of human reasoning, then proposed an incredible and 
omnicidal solution to its logical reconstruction of a security dilemma. As Deudney observes, 
given how rapid the decision to pull the nuclear trigger would be, strategic rationality not only 
takes us from MAD to NUTS, but further to DEAD: Destructive-Entrusted Automation 
Devices.156 There is no pretense of a conscious decision-maker in strategic games. Moreover, 
under US strategic protocol and also that of the Russians, potentially and even necessarily the 
decision to actualize a nuclear confrontation will be assisted with, if not implemented by, 
algorithmic decision machines.1 This current situation invites us to question whether we should 
leave the future of humanity to strategic and computable rationality, which presents the greatest 
challenges as those of maintaining credibility and strategic parity in a world of overkill nuclear 
strike capability. We are thus poised to pursue a security posture that is intelligible and serves 
humans worldwide in affording security by minimizing the chances of intentional and accidental 
nuclear conflict. 
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